Non-Bank Financial Institutions and Private Credit Investment in Uzbekistan [2026 Update]

Executive Summary

Uzbekistan is one of the more compelling frontier markets for private credit. The economy grew 6.5% in 2024 and accelerated to 7.7% in 2025, while consumer inflation slowed to 7.3%. The current-account deficit narrowed sharply, supported by a 28% surge in inbound remittances to USD 18.9 billion and favourable gold dynamics. Official reserves stood at USD 77.1 billion as of 1 March 2026, of which USD 67.7 billion was gold rather than liquid foreign-currency holdings.

The non-bank financial institution (NBFI) sector is scaling rapidly. By 1 January 2026, Uzbekistan had 132 microfinance organisations and 91 pawnshops. Their combined loan share reached 1.5% of all credit-institution loans by the end of 2024 and approximately 1.8% by early 2026.

For private credit investors, these non-bank lenders represent the primary channel through which capital reaches underserved consumer and micro-business borrowers.

That said, the risk map demands attention. Energy import dependence is a key concern: Uzbekistan is a net importer of mineral fuels, with petroleum and gas imports totalling USD 4.0 billion against exports of USD 1.5 billion in 2025. Household gas tariffs rose 59% and electricity tariffs 33% in the first half of 2025. These cost increases compress borrower disposable income and are a plausible driver of the recent uptick in MFI non-performing loans – the aggregate NPL ratio rose from 2.4% to 3.6% between January and February 2026, particularly in consumer and micro-business segments.

This document examines Uzbekistan’s macro environment, the structure and growth of the NBFI sector, the regulatory framework, comparative positioning relative to Mongolia and Kazakhstan, energy-price vulnerability, and the practical implications for private credit portfolio construction.

The Big Picture

Uzbekistan is a Central Asian country with a population exceeding 35 million, attracting growing attention from international investors. The economy is diversifying, the population is young, and the government’s commitment to market reforms has created a macro environment that supports financial deepening and credit expansion – the core conditions that make private credit viable at scale.

Growth and Economic Structure

Uzbekistan’s economy has delivered strong growth: real GDP increased by 6% in 2023, 6.5% in 2024 and 7.7% in 2025, driven by investment and private consumption. The government’s ongoing market reforms and privatisation efforts have kept growth well above the 5–6% range forecasters had projected.

The economy is diversifying but still relies heavily on commodities – natural gas, gold and cotton. That commodity exposure creates vulnerability to external shocks, but it also means there is meaningful upside if reforms succeed in developing industries and SMEs. The credit-to-GDP ratio has risen steadily, with private sector credit now at approximately 34–39% of GDP, up from barely 20% a decade ago.

That low base indicates significant room for further credit growth, which is relevant for investors assessing the long-term trajectory of non-bank lending.

Table 1: Core Macroeconomic Indicators (2020–2025)

Sources: World Bank, ITA, Focus Economics, National Statistics Committee of Uzbekistan, Central Bank of Uzbekistan, IMF Article IV 2024. * Estimated. ** 9M 2025 current-account deficit was only USD 207m. † Unemployment: national statistics methodology; ILO/World Bank modelled estimates are lower (~4.5% in 2023). Fiscal balance 2023 per la definizione di IMF di primary deficit.

Inflation and Monetary Policy

Inflation has been on a welcome downward trend. Consumer inflation was 9.8% in 2024 and 7.3% in 2025, with headline inflation still at 7.3% year on year in February 2026. The Central Bank of Uzbekistan’s (CBU) inflation target is 5%, which it expects to reach by 2027. Monetary conditions remain tight: the CBU kept the policy rate at 14% in March 2026.

However, headline inflation understates the cost pressures felt by NBFI borrowers. Administered tariff increases – household gas up 59% and electricity up 33% in the first half of 2025 – fall disproportionately on lower-income households and micro-businesses, the core customer segments for microfinance. These tariff-driven cost shocks do not fully register in the headline CPI basket on impact but feed through with a lag into broader services prices, transport costs and food-chain expenses. The effective inflation rate experienced by typical non-bank lending borrowers is likely higher than the reported 7.3%, and the gap between headline figures and lived affordability pressure is a risk that portfolio-level NPL metrics may not yet fully reflect.

High inflation has resulted in high nominal interest rates: average bank lending rates are in the 20–24% range, with NBFI rates higher still. For private credit investors, this means wide interest spreads – but also an environment in which borrower affordability must be closely monitored.

Fiscal and External Balance

Uzbekistan runs moderate fiscal deficits and a large but improving current account deficit. Foreign trade still shows a wide goods gap: exports reached USD 26.95 billion in 2024 and USD 33.81 billion in 2025, while imports reached USD 38.99 billion and USD 47.35 billion, respectively.

The current account nevertheless improved because remittances and favourable commodity dynamics – especially around gold – offset part of the trade deficit. The current-account deficit was USD 5.7 billion in 2024 and only USD 207 million in the first nine months of 2025. Inbound remittances increased by 28% in 2025 to USD 18.9 billion, up from USD 14.8 billion in 2024.

Table 2: Trade and External Indicators (2020–2025)

Sources: World Bank, ITA, Focus Economics, National Statistics Committee of Uzbekistan, Central Bank of Uzbekistan.

The reserve position is strong in headline terms but requires careful interpretation. Official reserves stood at USD 77.1 billion as of 1 March 2026. However, only USD 8.8 billion of that was in foreign currency reserves, while USD 67.7 billion was in gold.

Uzbekistan has a very large external buffer, but a significant portion of its resilience is linked to gold valuation and monetisation rather than immediately liquid hard-currency firepower. This composition matters for assessing the country’s ability to defend the currency under stress.

Table 3: Fiscal, Monetary and Reserve Indicators

Sources: World Bank, IMF, Central Bank of Uzbekistan. * As of 1 January 2025. Tariff data: World Bank Macro Poverty Outlook 2025. Note: headline CPI may understate the effective inflation experienced by lower-income NBFI borrowers, given the weight of administered tariff increases in household budgets.

Outlook

The macro outlook is positive but not without risks. Growth is expected to remain robust, supported by domestic demand and investment. If structural reforms continue – bank privatisations, energy sector reform and WTO accession efforts – they could boost productivity and foreign investment.

Key risks include commodity price swings (significant for Uzbek exports of gold and gas), a sharper slowdown in major trading partners (Russia, China), and tightening global financial conditions that affect external financing. Domestic risks centre on the pace of reform: delays or reversals could weigh on investor confidence and growth.

For private credit, the macro environment offers strong growth and improving stability, but caution is warranted regarding energy import costs, inflation, currency volatility, and the composition of reserves.

Banking and the NBFI Sector

The Banking System

Uzbekistan’s banking sector is extensive, with assets of over half of GDP, and is dominated by state-owned institutions. As of 1 January 2026, commercial banks held UZS 924.8 trillion in assets and UZS 604.0 trillion in loans. State-owned banks still accounted for 63% of assets and 67% of loans. The competitive environment remains shaped by a large, policy-influenced banking core, which is precisely why non-bank lenders have room to serve segments the banks do not reach.

Non-performing loans in banks are in the low to mid-single digits, partially due to rapid credit growth and some regulatory forbearance. Credit to the private sector has been expanding at over 20% annually, supported by directed lending programmes and the entry of new private banks.

Table 4: Private Credit to GDP (%) – Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, and G7 Average

Sources: World Bank, IMF, NBK, BIS, OECD.

The Role of Non-Bank Lenders

Non-bank lenders play an increasingly significant role in Uzbekistan’s credit market. While commercial banks dominate lending overall, NBFIs – microcredit organisations, credit unions and pawnshops – serve the underserved: low-income individuals and small businesses that lack the collateral or credit history required by banks.

As of 1 January 2026, Uzbekistan had 132 microfinance organisations, 91 pawnshops, and 35 commercial banks. The number of NBFIs has more than doubled since 2018, reflecting regulatory encouragement and rising demand for last-mile lending.

Official Central Bank data show that by the end of 2024, the share of loans issued by microfinance organisations and pawnshops had reached 1.5% of the total loan portfolio of all credit institutions. As of 1 January 2026, MFIs held UZS 11.8 trillion in assets and UZS 10.6 trillion in net loans, while pawnshops held UZS 0.74 trillion in assets and UZS 0.61 trillion in net loans. The combined MFI and pawnshop net-loan balance is now approximately 1.8% of the commercial-bank loan book.

Sector Growth and the Underwriting Question

NBFIs have been particularly effective in consumer finance, including personal microloans for household needs and financing for micro-entrepreneurs who lack collateral for bank loans. By offering flexible lending – quick approval, smaller amounts, and unconventional collateral such as jewellery in pawnshops – these non-bank lenders fill gaps left by mainstream banks.

The sector is scaling faster than many observers expected. The relevant question is no longer whether the segment exists, but whether growth is outrunning underwriting discipline.

Asset Quality: An Early Signal to Monitor

Asset quality remains manageable, but there is a signal that warrants attention. The aggregate MFI NPL ratio was 2.4% as of 1 January 2026, then rose to 3.6% as of 1 February 2026. These are not crisis-level numbers, but they are exactly the kind of movement that investors should track closely when a sector is growing quickly from a low base.

The timing of this increase is notable. It coincides with the period following steeply administered tariff rises – household gas up 59% and electricity up 33% in the first half of 2025. For lower-income households and micro-businesses, these cost increases represent a meaningful squeeze on disposable income and operating margins. The transmission mechanism is direct: higher utility costs reduce the cash available for loan repayment, while the resulting inflationary pressure on food and transport further erodes real income. Borrowers in the microfinance segment typically have thin financial buffers, making them the first to show stress when cost-of-living pressures accelerate. The 120-basis-point NPL increase in a single month is consistent with this tariff pass-through reaching the loan book, with a lag of approximately 6 to 9 months.

Table 5: Financial Sector Snapshot as of 1 January 2026

Source: Central Bank of Uzbekistan, consolidated balance sheets January–February 2026.

Regulatory Framework

Uzbekistan has been overhauling its regulations to support NBFI growth under central bank supervision, while gradually introducing consumer protection measures. For private credit investors, the regulatory direction is encouraging – but the details matter.

Supervision of NBFIs

In March 2022, the government approved the Law “On Non-Banking Credit Organisations and Microfinance Activities,” establishing procedures for licensing and operating NBFIs. The law defines permitted activities and consumer rights, and establishes a dedicated regulatory and supervisory system.

The CBU is the primary supervisory authority overseeing NBFIs, including microfinance organisations and pawnshops. Under the law, NBFIs are prohibited from taking retail deposits, which distinguishes them from banks. Licensing requirements include minimum capital standards and fit-and-proper tests for owners. This regulatory clarity is a meaningful improvement for investors seeking to deploy capital through licensed non-bank lenders with verifiable compliance.

Interest Rate Regulation

There are no statutory caps on interest rates for microloans in Uzbekistan. The absence of a ceiling allows domestic MFIs to charge relatively high rates (often 4–7% per month) in line with market demand. This means wide interest spreads are available for lenders with disciplined risk management, though it also raises consumer protection questions that the regulator may eventually address.

In recent years, the government has issued presidential decrees to encourage microfinance, including a 2019 decree that expanded the range of services NBFIs can offer. Private credit investors should monitor the regulatory trajectory: the current environment is permissive, but as the sector scales, tighter conduct or prudential rules are a realistic possibility.

Regional Context: Uzbekistan vs Mongolia vs Kazakhstan

Understanding how Uzbekistan’s NBFI sector compares with its Central Asian peers helps investors calibrate expectations. Each market offers a different combination of scale, maturity, regulation and risk.

Uzbekistan’s NBFI sector is in early growth with high potential and relatively flexible (but evolving) regulation. Mongolia’s NBFI sector is more mature in outreach and innovation and contributes significantly to consumer credit, but faces increasing regulatory constraints. Kazakhstan’s NBFI sector is well-regulated and integrated into the financial system, though it plays a niche role relative to the banking sector.

Table 6: Macroeconomic Indicators – Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Kazakhstan (2023)

Source: World Bank. * Estimated/provisional. † National statistics methodology; ILO/World Bank modelled estimate is ~4.5%.

Market Size and Depth

NBFI loans in Uzbekistan were approximately 1.8% of the total bank loan book as of January 2026. In Mongolia, NBFIs account for an estimated 10% of outstanding loans; in Kazakhstan, around 2–3%. This difference partly reflects overall credit depth: private credit is about 35% of GDP in Uzbekistan, roughly 39% in Mongolia, but only about 24% in Kazakhstan.

Uzbekistan’s large population offers a vast potential client base for non-bank lenders, but outreach remains limited. Mongolia’s sparse population has driven innovative microfinance (including group lending in rural areas). At the same time, Kazakhstan’s higher urbanisation means banks cover a larger share of the market, leaving NBFIs in a narrower niche.

Lending Rates and Regulatory Policies

Uzbekistan has imposed fewer controls on NBFI lending rates – there are no interest caps on microloans. By contrast, Mongolia set a cap of 4.5% per month (approximately 54% APR) on non-bank consumer loans under its 2022 Law on Regulation of Money Loan Activities. Kazakhstan has long-enforced interest rate limits: the maximum annual effective interest rate for loans is 56% by law, with further restrictions on short-term payday lending.

Kazakhstan also requires a 50% debt-to-income limit for borrowers. Mongolia introduced a similar DTI limit of 70% for digital loan borrowers. Uzbekistan has not yet implemented formal DTI caps for NBFIs. These policy differences make Uzbekistan’s regulatory environment more flexible for non-bank lenders regarding pricing and credit risk-taking, though they also leave borrowers with fewer protections.

Regulatory Maturity and Investor Considerations

Kazakhstan is generally seen as the most investor-friendly in terms of stability – it has a dedicated Agency for Regulation and Development of Financial Markets (ARDFM) overseeing NBFIs and more explicit rules for foreign investment. Several Kazakh NBFIs have raised capital via bond markets and stock exchange listings.

Mongolia’s Financial Regulatory Commission has permitted many entrants (500+ NBFIs) with low barriers to entry, indicating openness but also the risk of fragmentation. Uzbekistan had the most restrictive climate until recently; the 2022 NBFI law and broader reforms signal increased openness, but the country is still developing essential regulatory capacities and investor protections.

Market Characteristics

In Uzbekistan, NBFIs are mostly microcredit organisations and pawnshops concentrated in urban centres, which are beginning to diversify their product offerings. Mongolia’s NBFIs range from small lenders to publicly listed companies; many have adopted digital lending platforms. Kazakhstan’s NBFIs include microfinance organisations, finance companies affiliated with banks or retailers, pawnshops, and leasing firms, which benefit from the country’s advanced credit bureau system.

Uzbek NBFIs currently have the most leeway to set rates freely, new caps now constrain Mongolian NBFIs, and Kazakh NBFIs operate under moderate rate caps with close regulatory monitoring.

Energy-Price Vulnerability and Resilience

Uzbekistan is a net importer of mineral fuels, and domestic production is declining. This is a risk that private credit investors need to understand clearly, because energy cost shocks transmit directly into borrower affordability and, ultimately, loan performance.

Domestic energy production softened again in 2025. Official statistics show oil production of only 655.7 thousand tons and natural-gas production of 42.3 billion cubic metres. Extraction of crude oil and natural gas in January–December 2025 was only 96.2% of the prior-year level. That reinforces the direction of travel: Uzbekistan is becoming more exposed to imported energy at the margin.

The trade data make this concrete. In 2025, Uzbekistan exported USD 1.48 billion of mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials, but imported USD 4.00 billion. Petroleum and related products imports were USD 2.01 billion; imports of natural and manufactured gas were USD 1.66 billion. Uzbekistan is a net importer of the energy lines that matter for economic stability.

The supply arrangements underscore this dependence. Reuters reported that Russian gas exports via Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan were set to rise to 7.3 bcm in 2025, up from 5.6 bcm in 2024. Uzbekistan’s observable dependence is currently about pipeline gas and imported petroleum products rather than seaborne LNG specifically.

However, global gas shocks can still reach Uzbekistan indirectly. In March 2026, the Middle East conflict pushed Brent crude back above USD 100 per barrel and disrupted roughly one-fifth of global oil and LNG flows through the Strait of Hormuz. For Uzbekistan, the transmission channel is higher regional gas and petroleum costs.

Tariff Reform and the Credit-Quality Transmission Channel

Domestic tariff reform amplifies the pass-through. The World Bank reported that during the first half of 2025, household gas tariffs increased by 59% and electricity tariffs by 33%. These increases are part of a deliberate government policy to bring administered prices closer to cost-recovery levels. Still, the pace of adjustment creates a distinct channel of transmission into the credit market.

The mechanism is straightforward. Higher utility tariffs directly reduce households' disposable income and raise input costs for micro-businesses. Because energy costs feed into transport, food processing and services, these tariff increases propagate through the broader price level with a lag of roughly two to four quarters – meaning the 7.3% headline inflation figure for 2025 likely does not yet fully reflect the cost burden that borrowers are experiencing. The resulting squeeze on borrower cash flows hits loan repayment capacity, particularly for unsecured consumer loans and short-term micro-business credit – the segments where MFIs are most concentrated.

This is consistent with the data. The 120 basis-point rise in the aggregate MFI NPL ratio between 1 January and 1 February 2026 (from 2.4% to 3.6%) follows the H1 2025 tariff increases with a lag of approximately 6 to 9 months, which aligns with the typical pass-through timeline for utility cost shocks to affect consumer credit performance metrics.

For investors, headline inflation figures alone are insufficient for assessing borrower stress. The effective inflation rate experienced by typical non-bank lending borrowers – weighted towards energy, food and basic services – is likely materially higher than the reported CPI. Monitoring administered tariff schedules, utility cost pass-through and sector-level NPL trends at a monthly frequency provides more informative signals than quarterly macro releases.

There is a resilience case that should be acknowledged. Remittances into Uzbekistan increased by 28% in 2025 to USD 18.9 billion, helping stabilise the foreign-exchange market. The current account was nearly balanced in the first nine months of 2025. Official reserves are large, and the authorities retain room to smooth exchange-rate volatility. That said, this resilience rests partly on remittances and a reserve stock that is overwhelmingly gold – a meaningful buffer, but not an all-weather hedge against sustained energy-price pressure.

Table 7: Energy Exposure Snapshot

Sources: National Statistics Committee of Uzbekistan, Central Bank of Uzbekistan, World Bank, Reuters.

Key Risks and Opportunities

The Uzbek NBFI sector carries less regulatory risk following the 2022 law, but macro and credit risks require careful assessment. The market also presents genuine opportunities for disciplined private credit investors.

Regulatory Risks

As a newly reformed sector, Uzbek NBFIs face regulatory uncertainty. The 2022 law is still being implemented, and it does not specify capital adequacy ratios for NBFIs. Changes in licensing criteria or capital requirements could affect both incumbents and new entrants.

The CBU’s limited supervisory experience with NBFIs creates potential gaps in oversight. Consumer protection is a concern: interest rate caps have not been proposed, but the government could introduce new limits or stricter lending rules as the sector grows, thereby compressing NBFI margins. NBFIs cannot take retail deposits, so they rely on shareholder funding and institutional loans – funding sources that can tighten if economic conditions deteriorate.

Macroeconomic Risks

While inflation has improved to 7.3% in 2025, energy tariff reform (+59% household gas, +33% electricity in H1 2025) compresses borrower incomes and raises operational costs. As discussed in the energy section, the effective inflation experienced by NBFI borrowers likely exceeds headline CPI.

Currency volatility is a material risk. The Uzbekistani som was liberalised in 2017 and has been relatively stable recently. Still, any sharp devaluation would raise the cost of foreign-currency NBFI funding and could impair borrowers with unhedged dollar obligations. Macroeconomic shocks – such as a downturn in Russia affecting remittances or lower commodity export prices – could increase defaults in the NBFI segment, given that many borrowers have informal or vulnerable income sources.

The reserve composition adds nuance: of USD 77.1 billion in official reserves (1 March 2026), USD 67.7 billion is gold. That is a large buffer, but its value depends on gold prices rather than immediately liquid hard-currency holdings.

Credit and Portfolio Risks

Rapid growth in microcredit portfolios can strain risk management. Many Uzbek NBFI borrowers have thin credit histories and limited collateral, which inherently increases credit risk. Portfolio concentration is significant – the top few MFIs dominate the market, and a failure of a major player could undermine sector confidence.

NBFI loan books are heavily tilted toward consumer loans, which are unsecured and prone to delinquency if economic conditions worsen. The aggregate MFI NPL ratio rose from 2.4% (1 January 2026) to 3.6% (1 February 2026). While not at crisis levels, this movement warrants close monitoring in a rapidly scaling sector.

Opportunities

Despite these risks, Uzbekistan’s NBFI sector offers meaningful growth potential. Unmet demand for credit among individuals and micro-businesses remains strong. With a population exceeding 35 million and only approximately 44% of adults holding bank accounts, Uzbekistan is underbanked – precisely the kind of market where disciplined non-bank lenders can build attractive, high-yielding portfolios.

The government’s reform agenda supports this opportunity: authorities are committed to fostering private-sector credit through microfinance initiatives. International development institutions (the World Bank, IFC, and ADB) provide funding lines and technical assistance to the sector.

Interest spreads are wide. The policy rate is 14%, and NBFI lending rates can exceed 30–40% annually – creating the conditions for strong risk-adjusted returns when paired with rigorous underwriting and collections. The sector’s low base means double-digit growth can persist for years. As Uzbekistan continues privatising and modernising its financial sector, NBFIs could partner with banks or be acquired by them, providing additional exit pathways for early investors.

Implications for Private Credit Investors

The investment case for Uzbekistan remains constructive. The economy is deepening financially, the population is large, credit penetration is low relative to developed markets, and the NBFI sector is expanding from a small base. This is the kind of environment in which disciplined private credit strategies can deliver attractive, predictable income – provided the risks are understood and managed.

That said, the straightforward growth narrative should be tested. Uzbekistan is not simply a high-growth, underbanked story. Returns depend on managing three linked risks well: borrower affordability under tariff and inflation pressure, foreign-exchange and external-financing shocks, and the possibility that the regulator tightens conduct or prudential rules as the sector scales.

In this environment, portfolio construction matters more than headline market growth. The strongest counterparties are lenders with conservative leverage, shorter tenors, granular loan books, rigorous collection discipline, clean funding structures and limited FX mismatch.

A lender that grows rapidly while relying on expensive external funding and weak borrower verification is not a growth story – it is a delayed impairment problem.

A sustained energy shock would put pressure on affordability, collections, and FX stability, particularly in consumer finance and micro-business lending. The best-protected lenders will be those with short duration, strong collections, local-currency assets and liabilities, prudent leverage, and pricing power that does not rely on regulatory arbitrage.

The conclusion is constructive but selective. Uzbekistan's private credit market is more attractive than it was a year ago.Still, it is also more exposed to energy-price transmission and borrower-stress channels than a surface-level reading would suggest. The opportunity is real; the underwriting standard must match it.

Conclusion

Uzbekistan remains one of the more compelling frontier private credit markets in Central Asia. The macro picture improved sharply through 2025; the NBFI sector is scaling up, and the country’s external buffers are stronger than before.

At the same time, the risk map is clear: energy-import dependence, tariff reform, gold-heavy reserves, and early signs of strain in fast-growing MFI loan books all argue for disciplined risk selection. This does not weaken the case for investing. It raises the underwriting standard, which is exactly the kind of market where experienced private credit managers can add the most value.

Successful investing in Uzbekistan’s NBFI sector requires a nuanced understanding of the regulatory landscape, macroeconomic dynamics, and the specific needs of the underbanked segments of the market. For investors, this means careful risk management, alignment with government reforms, and a commitment to working with licensed, well-managed non-bank lenders that practise responsible lending.

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Appendix: Source Notes

The figures in this document come from a mix of official statistics, Central Bank releases and Reuters market reporting. Not all figures are directly comparable across sources because foreign-trade data, balance-of-payments data, reserve statistics and banking statistics use different definitions and cut-off dates. Where that matters, the text uses the most recent official source and explicitly states the date.

1. National Statistics Committee of Uzbekistan, Socio-economic situation of the Republic of Uzbekistan (January–December 2024): GDP growth 6.5%, inflation 9.8%, foreign trade 2024.
2. National Statistics Committee of Uzbekistan, Socio-economic situation of the Republic of Uzbekistan (January–December 2025): GDP growth 7.7%, inflation 7.3%, trade 2025, industrial production and extraction trends.
3. National Statistics Committee of Uzbekistan, Foreign trade turnover of the Republic of Uzbekistan (January–December 2025): trade composition, including fuel, petroleum and gas imports/exports.
4. Central Bank of Uzbekistan, Monetary Policy Review – 2025 Q4: 2025 GDP growth 7.7%, December 2025 inflation 7.3%, policy rate context.
5. Central Bank of Uzbekistan, inflation indicators and 18 March 2026 policy-rate decision: February 2026 inflation 7.3%, core inflation 6.3%, policy rate 14%.
6. Central Bank of Uzbekistan, Balance of Payments and International Investment Position of Uzbekistan, Annual Report 2024: 2024 current-account deficit USD 5.7bn, end-2024 NBFI loan share 1.5%.
7. Central Bank of Uzbekistan, Balance of Payments, International Investment Position and External Debt, 9 months of 2025: current-account deficit USD 207.3m in 9M 2025.
8. Central Bank of Uzbekistan, International Reserves of the Republic of Uzbekistan: official reserves USD 77.1bn on 1 March 2026; FX reserves USD 8.8bn; gold USD 67.7bn.
9. Central Bank of Uzbekistan, Review of International Migration and Foreign Exchange Operations of Individuals (March 2026): inbound remittances USD 18.9bn in 2025, up 28% y/y.
10. Central Bank of Uzbekistan, Information on major indicators of commercial banks as of 1 January 2026: banking assets, loans and state-bank shares.
11. Central Bank of Uzbekistan, consolidated balance sheets and NPL tables for microfinance organisations and pawnshops (January–February 2026): entities, assets, loans and MFI NPL ratios.
12. World Bank, Uzbekistan Macro Poverty Outlook / MPO 2025: H1 2025 household gas tariffs up 59% and electricity tariffs up 33%.
13. Reuters, March 2025/2026 energy reporting: Russian gas exports via Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan rising to 7.3 bcm in 2025 from 5.6 bcm in 2024; March 2026 energy-price spike and Hormuz disruption context.
14. Central Bank of Uzbekistan (2022), The Law “On non-banking credit organisations and microfinance activities.”
15. Raimov, K. (2024), Regulatory and Legal Framework for the Development of Financial Services of Non-Bank Credit Institutions in Uzbekistan, World Economics and Finance Bulletin.
16. IMF (2024), Republic of Uzbekistan: 2024 Article IV Consultation.
17. World Bank (2024), Uzbekistan Economic Update, October 2024.
18. Asian Development Bank (2023), Inclusive Finance Sector Development Program, Subprogram 1 – Uzbekistan.